We introduce a new attack model for collusion-secure codes, called the combined digit model, which represents signal processing attacks against the underlying watermarking level better than existing models.
INTRODUCTION
Fingerprinting provides a means for tracing the origin and distribution of digital data. Before distribution of digital content, it is modified by applying an imperceptible fingerprint, which plays the role of a personalized serial number. The fingerprint is usually embedded through a watermarking algorithm. Once an unauthorized copy of the content is found, the identity of at least one guilty user is determined by a tracing algorithm, which outputs a list of allegedly guilty users. This procedure is also known as 'traitor tracing' or 'forensic watermarking'. Reliable tracing of traitors requires security against attacks that aim at removing any identifiable information from a copy. Collusion attacks, where a group of pirates collude to compare their copies, are a particular threat. Coding theory has produced a number of collusionsecure codes (e.g. [1, 2] ). However, in any practical system they must be combined with some kind of embedding (watermarking) scheme. This can be viewed as a two-layer model [3, 4] , where the coding layer encodes user identities to protect against collusion attacks, and the underlying watermarking layer hides the message in the digital content. Until now, the development of watermarking schemes and fingerprinting codes has occurred mostly independent of each other; the interface between the fingerprinting code and the watermarking system has been specified in terms of the marking assumption and an attack model which specifies the type of symbol manipulation that the attackers are able to perform. According to the marking assumption, colluders are able to perform modifications only in those content segments that are not identical in all received copies. These segments are called detectable positions. The attack model describes the power of the colluders. The commonly used restricted digit model only allows colluders to 'mix and match' their copies of the content, i.e. the unauthorized copy is only composed of symbols that the attackers have available. The unreadable digit model allows for slightly stronger attacks: Besides mixing the content segments, the attackers can also erase the embedded fingerprint at detectable positions. Under the arbitrary digit model the attackers can put arbitrary symbols in detectable positions, while the general digit model additionally allows erasures at detectable positions.
However, all these attack models fail to completely capture the properties of the watermarking layer. The mismatch is especially pronounced in the case of spread spectrum watermarks. First, the marking assumption does not always hold, since signal processing attacks are occasionally able to remove a watermark symbol in undetectable positions. Furthermore, signal processing attacks result in symbol errors that seem to match the general digit model at a first glance, even though the general digit model allows for unrealistically strong attacks. Signal processing can induce the following symbol detection errors:
• If the colluders possess many differently watermarked copies of a segment, they have a good chance of erasing the watermark in that segment.
• Depending on the detector threshold, 'false positive' symbol detections can be induced by adding noise.
In practice both detection errors occur only with a certain (low) probability. While the general digit model allows these errors to occur, it makes the unrealistic assumption that both events happen with a 100% success rate. As a consequence, efficient code constructions for this model are not known. In view of this discrepancy between the potency of actual attacks on the one hand and the available models on the other hand, we introduce a new and more realistic attack model which we call the combined digit model. It allows for symbol errors with certain (parametrisable) probabilities, resulting from common attacks in the watermarking layer. In contrast to the general digit model, we show that efficient fingerprinting codes can be constructed, namely variants of the arbitrary-symbol Tardos code [5, 6] . , which is asymptotically optimal. (Here c0 denotes the number of colluders that can be resisted, and ε1 is the maximum allowed probability of accusing a fixed innocent user.) Blayer and Tassa [7] ,Škorić et al. [8, 5] and Nuida et al. [9] showed how to significantly reduce the constant '100' in the length bound. The paper [5] also provided a construction for non-binary alphabets and showed how to reduce the code length even further by introducing a symbol-symmetric accusation strategy. All these results were derived under the common assumption of the restricted digit model. As noted in [5] the nonbinary Tardos code can also be analyzed in the unreadable digit model, where the colluders may erase fingerprint symbols with 100% success rate in detectable positions. In this case, the required code length is considerably longer, which makes the scheme impractical. Another attack model has been defined by Guth and Pfitzmann in [10] , which allows for some imperfections of the watermark layer. However, their attack model is less strong than the one we use; codes for their model, based on the Boneh-Shaw code, are described in [10, 4] . Xie et al. [6] introduced two alternative accusation methods for the Tardos code, and an attack model which allows attackers to perform signal processing attacks on the content (which amounts to occasionally falsely detected fingerprint symbols) as well as mixing of several watermark symbols in one position. Their analysis is purely experimental, and shows that the two accusation methods both perform well. Spread-spectrum watermarking is known to provide a certain level of collusion-security in itself. However, without an additional coding or fingerprinting layer, such solutions scale very poorly in the number of users [4] . Existing results have been limited to simulations up to about 5000 users.
Contribution. In this paper we introduce an attack model which we call the combined digit model. In each content segment the attackers may use multiple symbols to create their pirated version (provided that they have observed them, in accordance with the marking condition). Depending on how many symbols they used in their attack, they can either successfully erase the embedded watermark or create a content copy that has multiple symbols embedded in each segment. The probability of generating an erasure depends on the number of symbols at hand and is parametrisable. Furthermore, the colluders may perform a sophisticated attack, where a symbol gets detected that was not used by the colluders during their attack; however, the latter event only happens with a small probability. Simulation results confirm that such an attack model is realistic. Note that this attack is stronger than the restricted digit model. It turns out that it still allows construction of probabilistic Tardos-like codes, whose code length is only slightly larger than the shortest Tardos codes known in the restricted digit model. In particular, we use the accusation methods of [6] .
THE ATTACK MODEL

Notation
Let Σ be the alphabet of the fingerprinting code, n be the number of users to be accommodated in the system and m the number of symbols in the fingerprint (the number of segments in the content). Furthermore, we denote with ε 1 the probability that one specific innocent user gets falsely accused and with ε2 the probability that the accusation fails to accuse any guilty user. The distributed codewords can be arranged as an n × m matrix X, where the j-th row corresponds to the fingerprint given to the j-th user. Let C be a set of colluding users. We denote by c the number of colluders and by X C the c × m matrix of codewords distributed to the colluders. The colluders use a (possibly nondeterministic) strategy ρ to create an unauthorized copy of the content from their personalized copies. The unauthorized copy carries a fingerprint y which depends on both the strategy and the received codewords, i.e. y = ρ(X C ). Note that while Xji ∈ Σ, the attacked fingerprint at position i cannot be expressed as a vector over Σ, as multiple symbols may be present in each segment.
The Combined Digit Model
The proposed combined digit model addresses watermark decoders which return a (possibly empty) set of symbols whose corresponding watermark are deemed to be present in the segment. Traditional fingerprinting codes were designed for a model where only a single symbol, or possibly an erasure (or empty set), would be identified by the decoder. Consequently, these codes cannot effectively deal with the combined digit model. The following observations are critical:
• Current watermarking schemes offer a considerable level of robustness; however, it is still possible to erase watermarks with a small probability, e.g. due to the addition of noise to the content.
• Watermark detectors have a small probability of 'false positives' on the watermarking level, i.e., in the presence of an attack, the watermark decoder can output symbols which were never embedded. This was noted in a practical setting by [11] .
• For big coalitions, the colluders have a large number of differently watermarked content segments available, and they are faced with a trade-off. The more different versions of the segment they use in their attack, the better is their chance of erasing the watermark completely. However, if they fail to erase it, using more symbols means that they will reveal more symbols to the decoder, giving away more information about their identities.
Both erasures and false positives have been addressed previously for several fingerprinting codes. The binary Tardos code only requires a modest increase in length to deal with erasures [2] and with false positives [12] . However, there is no formal security model that allows to utilise information about multiple watermarks from the underlying watermark detector in the fingerprint decoder. During watermark embedding, each symbol of a fingerprint is embedded into the corresponding content segment. During the tracing process, a watermark decoder outputs an list Φ i ⊆ Σ of symbols which are deemed to be present in segment i. For each symbol α, we define a binary detection decision Wiα, where Wiα = 1 if α ∈ Φi and Wiα = 0 if α ∈ Φi. The combined digit model is parametrized through a number of different probabilities, representing the power of the colluders:
• Let r denote the false positive rate. That is the probability that W iα = 1 given that the colluders did not use the symbol α to create yi. (Either they did not have it or they chose not to use it.) We assume that this probability depends neither on i nor on α.
• Let u ψ denote the true positive detection rate where the colluders used ψ different segments in their attack. That is the probability that Wiα = 1, given that α belongs to one of the ψ symbols used in the attack.
The numbers r and u ψ depend on the amount of noise that can be introduced by the attackers. The attack model implies that whenever the attackers make use of ψ different symbols in a segment, the detector will trigger on these symbols with probability u ψ , while the detector will only be triggered with probability r on the other symbols. For ψ = 1, the detection probability is close to 1. We assume that u ψ is a decreasing function of ψ. The choice of ψ is part of the colluder strategy ρ.
Empirical justification of the attack model
In order to empirically justify the assumptions made in the combined digit model as well as to derive realistic values of the parameters, we performed several simulations based on the model of Zhao et al. [13] , using Gaussian spread-spectrum watermarking with a nonblind detector. The detector uses the Z statistic as recommended in [13] . Each of the q-ary symbols in the outer (Tardos) code is represented by a random Gaussian signal of length n = 100, mean μ = 0, and variance σ 2 = 1/9. The employed attack was averaging with added uniform noise, identified as the best known attack in [14] . Following [13] , distortion was measured by MSE-JND (Mean Squared Error Just-Noticeable-Difference), and the attack was calibrated to give an average normalised MSE-JND of 0.01 per sample. The resulting error rates from simulations with 1000 tests are shown in Figs. 1 and 2 . Note that all the plots coincide, demonstrating that r does not depend on ψ, exactly as we assumed in our model. It allows us to express the true positive rate u ψ as a function of r instead of as a function of the detection threshold. This is shown in Fig. 2. As expected, this curve shows a tradeoff between false positive and false negative, and u ψ is a decreasing function of ψ. The curves in Fig. 2 can be used to provide realistic numbers u ψ . Table 1 lists u ψ values that will be used in subsequent experiments. 
CODES IN THE COMBINED DIGIT MODEL
We use two variants of the 'symmetric' Tardos code proposed in [5] that employ the accusation functions introduced in [6] in order to construct efficient codes for the combined digit model.
Code generation and embedding
The distributor produces an n × m matrix X of q-ary symbols; the rows of the matrix correspond to the fingerprints for the individual users. The matrix is filled in a two-step procedure:
The distributor first generates m independent random vectors
. The random variables follow a special case of the Dirichlet distribution,
Here
is the Dirac delta function. The delta function ensures that the integration is done only over p such that P β p β = 1. The parameter κ determines the shape of Fqκ. For the binary alphabet one sets κ = 1/2, reproducing Tardos' distribution function [2] . In the second step, the distributor generates the columns of X independently. In the i-th column, the vector p (i) determines the probabilities of generating each specific symbol in the alphabet:
α . Before the content is released to user j, it is watermarked with the j-th row of the matrix X.
Accusation
For each user j, the distributor computes the 'accusation sum' from X,p and the attacked content copy y. He decides that the user j is guilty if the accusation sum exceeds a threshold Z, where Z is referred to as the 'accusation threshold'. We introduce the notation g(1, p) = Accusation sum, method A. The watermark detector is applied to y, for every location 1 ≤ i ≤ m and for every watermark symbol α ∈ Σ to obtain the values Wiα. The accusation sum Aj is computed as
where x returns the value 1 if the Boolean formula x evaluates to TRUE and 0 otherwise. Thus, in each segment accusations are summed up for all the detected symbols.
Accusation sum, method B. We denote with Φi = {α ∈ Σ : Wiα = 1} the set of symbols that are detected at content segment i. We further introduce the notation Pi = P
Thus, instead of accusing for each symbol separately as in method A, the symbols are grouped into two sets (detected/undetected at position i), and a user's accusation is based on the presence of his symbol Xji in one of these sets.
ANALYSIS
We make two assumptions about the attack strategy ρ. These are the same assumptions as in [5] . All members of the coalition are equivalent (member symmetry). The colluders base their decisions only on the number of symbols they receive, and not on the identity of the members who receive them. Furthermore, the strategy for outputting the i-th segment of the colluded copy y does not depend on the value i, i.e. the same strategy is used for all segments (column symmetry). However, we do allow the strategy to depend on the full matrix X C . The first assumption is motivated by the row symmetry of the code generation and accusation procedures. The second assumption is motivated by the column symmetry of these procedures.
Performance indicator
The main collusion resistance performance indicator of a fingerprinting code is the coalition size c0 that can be defeated by a code of a fixed length m, for fixed false positive and false negative error probabilities, and a fixed number of users n. The larger c0, the better the code. This can be re-expressed as the code length m required to defeat a coalition of fixed size c0, for fixed false positive and false negative error probabilities, for a fixed number of users n. The smaller m is, the better the code. The original Tardos , where G = 100. It was shown in [5] that asymptotically for large c,
suffices to guarantee the desired error rates. Hereσinn andμ are statistical parameters of the accusation: mσinn stands for the standard deviation of an innocent user's accusation sum; mμ stands for the expectation value of the coalition's collective accusation sum, which is defined as the sum of all accusation values of colluders (see the full version of this paper [15] for a precise definition). The smaller G, the better the code.
Performance
We will use the expression (4) as the main performance indicator of a fingerprinting scheme. Through painstaking analysis it is possible to derive analytic upper bounds G A and GB on the performance indicators for accusation methods A and B; due to space restrictions, we refer the reader to the full version of this paper [15] for details.
Accusation Method A. In Fig. 3 , GA is plotted for various parameter settings. In all graphs we use c = 20, and set u ψ according to Table 1 . We see the following trends. For each q, the performance parameter GA has a minimum as a function of κ, just as in the restricted digit model [5] , with almost exactly the same values for the optimal κ. Furthermore, GA increases as a function of r. This is expected, since the performance gets worse when the attackers become more powerful.
Accusation Method B. In Fig. 4 , GB is plotted for various parameter settings. We see the same trends as in method A. For each q, the performance parameter GB has a minimum as a function of κ, just as in the restricted digit model [5] , with almost exactly the same values for the optimal κ. Furthermore, GB increases as a function of r, as expected.
Comparison. The numerical results are summarized in Table 2 . For each of the curves in Figs. 3 and 4 we have taken the minimum, and listed the optimal κ and G value. We have also included the results from [5] for the restricted digit model. It is clear that methods A and B do not differ dramatically. (That was also the case in [6] , where the code was studied for a different attack model, and with a different performance indicator.) Method A is better at q = 3, and method B is better at q ≥ 4.
What is most striking is that even a strong attack (r = 0.1) does not seriously reduce the effectiveness of the code. Compared to the restricted digit model, the code length has to be increased by less than a factor 2.5. We conclude that accusation methods A and B are quite effective for dealing with the increased attack strength in the combined digit model. 
SUMMARY
We have introduced a new attack model for collusion-secure codes, the combined digit model. The model comprises averaging attacks and signal processing attacks in a way that is more realistic than existing models. The attack allows colluders to 'merge' watermark symbols, erase watermarks in case enough different copes are available to the colluders, and introduce false positives with a small probability. We have examined two modifications of the accusation sum in the symbol-symmetric Tardos scheme. Method A sums up accusations for each detected symbol separately. Method B groups all detected symbols together and then applies the Tardos accusation function. Both accusation methods yield an efficient code for the new attack model. [4] H.G. Schaathun, "On error-correcting fingerprinting codes for 
